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Unregistered Religious Marriages are neither Valid nor Void  
In Her Majesty's Attorney General v Akhter & Anor [2020] EWCA Civ 122, the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that unregistered religious marriages are to be regarded as ‘non-qualifying 
ceremonies’ which are outside the scope of marriage legislation. This means that the parties 
will be unable to seek financial remedy orders on relationship breakdown.  The judgment  
reversed the decision of Williams J at first instance, in Akhter v Khan [2018] EWFC 54, 
which applied what his Lordship called a ‘holistic’ and ‘flexible’ approach to hold that an 
unregistered religious marriage could be treated as a void marriage and be entitled to 
financial remedies. The Court of Appeal has re-established the previous position that 
Williams J’s flexibility sought to circumvent.  
The facts of the case relate to a typical unregistered religious marriage. In 1998, 
Nasreen Akhter and Mohammed Shabaz Khan had a nikah ceremony but had not registered 
the marriage under civil law. They intended to do but as time went on Khan refused to 
register it.   After eighteen years and after having four children, the relationship broke down 
in 2016 and the petitioner, Akhter, issued a petition for divorce from the respondent, Khan.  
Khan defended the divorce on the basis that the parties had not entered a valid marriage 
according to English law. In her reply, Akhter put forward two arguments. The first was that 
that the presumption of marriage arising out of cohabitation and reputation applied so as to 
validate the marriage. In the alternative, she argued that that the marriage was a void 
marriage within section 11(a)(iii) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. 
At first instance, the first argument was quickly rejected on the basis that there was no 
evidence to support a on a presumed ceremony having taken place ([2018] EWFC 54 paras 
38, 40 and 41). However, the second argument was successful. Williams J held that it had 
been a void marriage and issued a decree of nullity.  Case law had established a threefold 
distinction between valid marriages, void marriages and non-marriages (para 6).  Williams J 
noted that where a couple had undergone public marriage ceremony and had ‘lived a married 
life and been accepted as married by their communities’ then designating this as a non-
marriage felt ‘instinctively uncomfortable ... and might rightly be regarded as insulting by 
many’ (para 8).   This informed his judgment.  Williams J held that the marriage was void 
because there was an intention to follow up the nikah with a ceremony that complied with 
marriage law. He held that the law on nullity should be interpreted in a way that was ‘flexible 
to reflect in particular the Article 8 [ECHR] rights of the parties and the children’ and this 
requires that the court take a holistic view of a process rather than a single ceremony’ (para 
94).  It was a relevant factor ‘whether the failure to complete all the legal formalities was a 
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joint decision or due to the failure of one party to complete them’ (para 94).  Article 8 
supported a finding of a decree of a void marriage ‘in respect of those who sought to effect or 
intended to effect a legal marriage’ (para 80).  Williams J  held that ‘the expression non-
marriage should be reserved only to those situations such as acting or children playing where 
there has never been any intention to genuinely create a marriage’ (para 81).  The Attorney 
General appealed. (Neither the petitioner nor the respondent took any active part in this 
appeal because they had reached an agreed settlement). 
Sir Terence Etherton MR, Lady Justice King and Lord Justice Moylan, allowed the 
appeal ([2020] EWCA Civ 122) and set aside Williams J’s order since ‘there was, in this 
case, no ceremony in respect of which a decree of nullity could be granted’ (para 128). The 
Court of Appeal considered that the case raised two issues: ‘(i) Whether there are ceremonies 
or other acts which do not create a marriage, even a void marriage, within the scope of s. 11 
of the 1973 Act; and (ii) If there are, whether the December 1998 ceremony was such a 
ceremony, currently described as a non-marriage, or whether, as Williams J decided, it 
created a void marriage’ (para 5). These were slightly odd questions to ask since it was not 
disputed that there may be some acts or ceremonies that would not create a void marriage. 
The question in play was rather where the line ought to be drawn and whether Williams J had 
drawn the line in the right place by saying that any intention to genuinely create marriage 
would render it void.  The Court of Appeal held that Williams J had not drawn the line in the 
correct place. They insisted that there needed to be a ceremony under the Marriage Act which 
suffers from a defect in order for there to be a void marriage.  Answering their two issues the 
Court concluded that (i) there could be ceremonies which do not create a marriage, or even a 
void marriage and so do not entitle the parties to a decree of nullity (para 65); and (ii) the 
religious ceremony  did not create a void marriage because it was ‘a non-qualifying 
ceremony’ (para 123). They agreed with what they termed ‘Williams J’s disquiet about the 
use of the term “non-marriage”’ (para 7).  However, they suggested that ‘a better way of 
describing the legal consequences of what has happened is to use the expression, “non-
qualifying ceremony”’ to signify that the relationships ‘are outside the scope of both the 1949 
and the 1973 Acts’ and to stress ‘that the focus should be on the ceremony’ (para 64). 
While Williams J had focused on the unfairness of the category of non-marriage, the 
Court of Appeal was more concerned with preserving the certainty of the category of 
marriage (para 10).   They insisted that the question of ‘whether a ceremony created a valid 
marriage or a void marriage or was of no legal effect at all must be determined at the date of 
the ceremony’ (para 124). It could not ‘depend on whether the parties might have agreed to 
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undertake a further step or steps’ since this ‘might result in a party being married even when 
they had changed their mind part way through the process’ (para 126). The Court pointed out 
that no one can be forced to marry and indeed, forcing someone to marry is a criminal 
offence (para 88).  The Court of Appeal was also quick to disregard the Article 8 argument, 
applying Serife Yigit v Turkey (3976/05) (2011) 53 EHRR 25, to hold that while Article 8 was 
engaged ‘the failure of the state to recognise the Nikah as a legal marriage is not in breach of 
those rights’ (para 106).  It was also noted that in Serife the ‘rules laying down the 
substantive and formal conditions governing civil marriage are clear and accessible and the 
arrangements for contracting a civil marriage are straightforward and do not place an 
excessive burden on the persons concerned’.  The Court of Appeal stated that this was also 
true of England and Wales.  However, the widespread concerns about unregistered religious 
marriages and the current review of weddings law by the Law Commission, suggest that the 
law is far from clear, accessible, straightforward and burden-free.  
The Court of Appeal has removed a problematic solution to the unregistered religious 
marriages issue but it is clear that the problem still remains.  There is a need to provide 
redress for those who are in unregistered religious marriages either where this is unwitting on 
the part of one or both of the parties or where this is not agreed by one of the parties (such as 
in this case where the husband promised that they would comply with marriage registration 
laws at a later date).  In the event of relationship breakdown, those who are in unregistered 
religious marriages are left to either resolve the dispute themselves or use a religious form of 
authority such as a Sharia Council.  This is inadequate. The Marriage Act 1949 (Amendment) 
Bill, a Private Members Bill currently before Parliament, seeks to deal with the issue by 
making it an offence to purport to solemnise an unregistered religious marriage. This, 
however, assumes that the issue lies with celebrants, is unlikely to stop the practice and 
would fail to provide a remedy for those in unregistered marriages on relationship 
breakdown.  A preferable solution would be to deal with this in the context of cohabitation 
law reform.  The Court of Appeal decision confirms that parties in unregistered religious 
marriages will continue to have the same legal status as cohabiting couples. England and 
Wales currently has no legislative provision that specifically provides cohabitants with 
financial relief in the event of the ending of a relationship that has generated economic 
disadvantage. Remedying this would mitigate the problem of unregistered religious marriages 
meaning that there would be no need for the well meaning but flawed judicial creativity 
which the Court of Appeal has now rightly rejected. 
Russell Sandberg 
